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Executive Summary
An assessment of the conduct of monetary policy in Europe must
necessarily be made along two distinct and complementary lines. The
first is a comparison with the policies followed in the past. The second
line has to assess whether monetary policy is adapted to the new
conditions that came into existence with the inception of the Euro. The
picture with respect to these two criteria is mixed. Monetary policy
has certainly improved with respect to the policies followed in the
1990s, during the run up to the euro. In fact, the ECB proved to be
much more growth friendly than its predecessors. On the other hand,
though, the challenges posed by the new environment, the
management of a large open economy, have not been internalized by
the ECB, that was less reactive than the Fed, and too focussed on
current inflation. The tightening of monetary conditions in the euro
zone, mainly due to the euro appreciation, was not sufficiently
cautioned by monetary policy. Especially considering the poor
economic performances of the euro zone in the past few years, we
must conclude that monetary policy was not helpful in fostering
growth recovery in the euro area.  The ECB did not fully recognise its
new responsibility of conducting the monetary policy of a “big
country”.
2“La critique est aisée, mais l’art est difficile”
The most obvious way to assess monetary policy in Europe since the ECB came into
existence is to compare it with the policies that preceded it, particularly in the years
immediately preceding the inception of the euro. Nevertheless, such an analysis would
necessarily be incomplete if we did not ask at the same time whether the policy framework
put in place by the ECB is consistent with its environment. Such a dual assessment is all the
more necessary, that the monetary union represented a regime change for Europe. Before, if
we except Germany, monetary conditions in each single European countries of the EMS
were determined by the exigency of keeping the exchange rate parity with the DM. No
wonder then if most of the time, it was not adapted to internal economic conditions. Now,
the ECB enjoys full monetary policy autonomy, and has to take into account the global
effects of its policy. Thus, any assessment necessarily has to consider whether the ECB
stood up to this increased responsibility. The natural benchmark against which to compare
the ECB is of course the US Fed, the only other central bank that faces such a global
responsibility.
To anticipate on the conclusions, if on one side the record of monetary policy under the
ECB has considerably improved with respect to the policies followed in the 1990s, on the
other it does not seem to have fully internalized the regime change, and has been too inertial
if we consider its increased responsibilities.
A Comparison with the 1990s: A More Appropriate Monetary Policy
Figure 1 shows the short term real interest rate, and the growth rate, since 1989. It further
reports the "critical gap", the difference between the two that can be seen as a first broad
measure of the degree of restrictiveness of monetary policy (a more sophisticated measure
will be discussed below).
Figure 1. Eurozone The Critical Gap
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3It is clear that since the run-up to the euro began, the monetary stance progressively
became accommodating, and that since 1999 the critical gap remained stable at low levels.
Thus, a comparison with past behaviour seems to show a monetary policy more growth
friendly.
The ECB and the New Policy Regime
Limiting the assessment of ECB action to a comparison with past behaviours in Europe is
not enough for at least two reasons. First, in general, evaluation should never be solely
based on comparative terms; second, this is even truer when there is a regime change.
Standard textbook analysis routinely separates the study of small open economies, facing
external constraints, from the study of large economies. It is no doubt that with the Euro, the
model of reference for Europe became the latter, reducing the constraints facing monetary
policy, but at the same time increasing its responsibility. How did the ECB behave, faced
with this new responsibility?
The First Years
The relatively short period since the European Central Bank came into existence was
characterized by a number of important challenges for the authorities in charge with
European economic policy management: the end of the internet bubble, the Afghan and
Iraqi wars, the terror attacks of September 11, the droughts and the agricultural prices
fluctuations, the animal diseases, the oil price fluctuations. The first three years of operation
of the ECB were the object of a previous briefing paper (BP 1-2003, February1). The Bank
was reactive to factors that directly affected inflation; thus, it was quite active in the years
1999-2000, in response to shocks in oil and food prices, and in trying to contrast the
depreciation of the euro. On the other hand, it showed more inertia in reacting to shocks that
firstly had an impact on income and employment, and only through that channel on prices:
facing the US slowdown of 2001, and its consequences on output in the euro zone, it did
react only slowly and under exceptional circumstances (notably the 9/11 events). In a
sentence, the ECB strictly followed its main objective (price stability), but much less so its
secondary one, the promotion of economic growth. While this behaviour could be justified
by the institutional tasks of the ECB, it also showed two important problems with such a
state of affairs. First, the objective of price stability was pushed too far, even when it was
becoming evident to most observers that a cut in rates to sustain growth would not hamper
the inflation objective of the ECB. Secondly, the excessive focus on inflation, unveiled an
insufficiently forward looking attitude, as the future disinflationary effects of the slowdown
were not taken into consideration. The briefing paper concluded by arguing that if the
restrictiveness of the Bank's behaviour had to be explained by the attempt to establish a
reputation, that attempt had not been entirely successful.
The Period 2002-2004
What are the main events that characterized the past two years, and against which we
need to assess the conduct of monetary policy in the euro zone? We can enumerate three of
them.
                                                
1 http://www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/econ/pdf/emu/speeches/20030217/fitoussi.pdf
4(i) The prolonged stagnation of the European economy.
Figure 2 compares the growth performances of the US and of the Euro zone in the past
few years. It clearly shows that, though deeper than in Europe, the recession on the other
side of the Atlantic was very short lived, and followed by a growth recovery as soon as
2002, and  impetuous growth in the two years 2003-2004. Europe, on the other hand,
experienced a prolonged period of disappointing growth, with the three largest economies
de facto stagnating. In spite of sluggish growth, since the first quarter of 2001, the ECB
refinancing rate was always higher than the Fed Funds Rate, and the gap was closed only
late in 2004, following the gradual rate increase in the United States.
Figure 2.  Real GDP and Central Bank Rates 
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(ii) The stabilization of inflation
The second remarkable fact of the last two years is the stabilization of inflation. After the
shocks of the years 1999-2001, inflation in Euroland fluctuated  around 2%, the level
targeted by the ECB (see figure 3). In fact, since April 2002, it oscillated between a
minimum of 1.7% and a maximum of 2.4%. Much of this variation was furthermore due to
the sharp increase of oil prices. If we consider core inflation, its level has been constantly
below 2% since January 2003.
5Figure 3. Inflation and ECB Rates
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Figure 4. $/€ Exchange Rate and ECB Rates
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(ii) The spectacular depreciation of the dollar
Since its minimum value (0.84 dollars for an euro) in July 2001, the exchange ratio
between the US dollar and the euro has climbed almost 60% to its current level of around
1.30 (see figure 4). In the years 2003-04 the dollar depreciated by 35%. The euro also
6appreciated with respect to the currencies pegged to the dollar, in particular the Chinese
Yuan. With some notable exceptions, European exports suffered from this exchange rate
dynamics.
The ECB Inertia in a Changing World
The pattern that was appearing towards the end of 2001 – an extreme cautiousness of the
ECB – has been confirmed by the policy followed since then. After the drop following the
terror attacks, the main refinancing rate was left unchanged at 3.25% from November 2001
to November 2002. Then, over the following semester it was brought down to 2%, and since
then (June 2003), it has been left unchanged. One could argue that this conduct was
appropriate, given that the inflation rate was more or less regularly around its target level,
and that the statutory mandate of the ECB is to maintain price stability.
Nevertheless, if we broaden the perspective, we obtain a somewhat different picture, in
which the inertia of the ECB is
harder to justify. Figure 5 exhibits
the Monetary Conditions Indicator
(MCI), built by OFCE (see box 1
for details on how the index is
constructed). This indicator gives a
synthetic measure of monetary
policy tightness. It embeds both
interest rates and the exchange
rate; as such it is well suited to
capture the remarkable
appreciation of the euro. We can
see that since 2002 monetary
conditions have strongly loosened
in the US, thanks to the strong
depreciation of the dollar; not even
the gradual tightening of monetary
policy, over the past few months,
has changed the trend. In Europe,
over the same time span, the
indicator of monetary conditions
has been constantly tightening,
mainly because of the euro
appreciation that was not contrasted by an aggressive monetary stance. In other words, the
combination of interest rates and the effective exchange rate is tighter today than it was in
1999, a period of higher growth.
Box 1. The Monetary Conditions Indicator (MCI)
The MCI is aimed at giving a synthetic measure of the
financial constraint faced by an economy. First it
considers the deviation of real interest rates from the rate
of growth (the "critical gap"), that affects the economy
mainly through the investment function and the cost of
credit. The second element is the effective real exchange
rate, that represents an indicator of competitiveness.
The real interest rate variable is an average of the short
term rate, determined by monetary policy, and the long
term rate determined by the markets. By taking the
critical gap, we obtain a relative measure that allows
comparisons across countries. Comparability across
countries is also the reason why the exchange rate
variable is taken as a deviation from its 10 years average.
Finally, the weights come from the macroeconomic
model OFCE uses for its forecasts:  1 for the interest rate,
and 0.2 for the effective exchange rate.
7Figure 5. Monetary Conditions Indicator
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The second reason that calls for an in depth analysis of monetary policy is the inflation
target per se. If it is true that inflation has been fluctuating around 2% in the past two years,
justifying the stability of ECB rates with respect to its target, it is also true that precisely the
decision of the ECB to set the target rate at 2% may be seen as the "original sin" of
monetary policy in the Euro zone. In fact, the period of low inflation that preceded the
inception of the single currency has created an historical anchor that in view of the
following events proved to be too low, and hence induced a restrictive bias in monetary
policy. I argued elsewhere2 that a correct target rate for inflation should be 2.5% or 3%.
Fit for the New Role?
The preceding analysis gives a mixed picture of the ECB action. On one side, the bank
showed more responsiveness to current economic conditions than the central banks of
individual countries of the euro zone over the 1990s. On the other hand, though, the ECB
policy did not prove to be completely adequate to the new regime introduced by the euro.
Even if it can't be said that monetary policy was procyclical, it is quite evident that the
overall monetary stance in the past few years was not supportive of growth. The bank did
not seem able to meet the challenge posed on one side by its new capacity to influence
global variables like the exchange rate, and on the other by the constraints on fiscal policy in
the EMU that leave monetary policy as the only union-wide tool to sustain growth and
income. It is not by chance that the other "large open economy", the US, statutory imposes
growth as an objective for its central bank. The anomaly of the ECB statute, an exclusive
focus on inflation, may be seen as a "small country" legacy and should be corrected. The
European Constitutional Treaty is a missed opportunity in this sense.
                                                
2 Fitoussi, J.-P., La Règle Et Le Choix. Paris, La république des idées, Seuil, 2002.
8The inertia of the ECB, compared with the activism and the pre-emptive moves of the
Fed may have two different explanations; one could think that the ECB correctly focused on
inflation, and hence that its limited activism reflects the good accomplishment of its
mission. Or, one could conclude, at the opposite, that the ECB has been unable to base its
policy on anticipation of future events, as the Fed does, and that its inertia derives from a
backward looking attitude (a "feedback policy"), unfit to the leading role monetary policy
has to have in a currency union of such a big size.
